Waging a Just War Against ISIS
Lauren Ensor
President Donald Trump’s recent tweet boasting the capture of five of the “most wanted” ISIS leaders announces another major feat in the ‘war on terror’.
But what does this mean for the war against ISIS at home? Data reveals upwards of 1,200 people have been killed by ISIS-directed or inspired terror attacks outside of the caliphate, with figures showing an upward trend for these kinds of attacks in Europe and within the United States. Evidently, the aggressive campaign to reclaim Iraqi and Syrian territory has negatively affected this trend.
While the impact these high-profile captures have on the belligerent Islamic State’s caliphate is clearly good – it breaks up their ground network making it increasingly impossible to plan and coordinate campaigns – the further reaching dimensions of ISIS remain untouched. These dimensions, or the ISIS-affiliated and inspired ‘cells’, have historically responded to the reduction of territory and to the capture or, successful targeting against its leaders by performing retributive action elsewhere. For example, former French President François Hollande’s commitment to the war on terror and successive air-strikes in Syria both purportedly inspired the coordinated attacks in Paris in 2015.
This highlights a very real problem for the US and the Global Coalition; how to justly fight against the pushback of ISIS outside of the caliphate.
Firstly, it should be stated, that the ‘war at home’ is not a real war. The requirements, while being mostly restricted to police work, render rules pertaining to what is ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ in warfare void. Civilian casualties in this instance, unlike in the contexts of war, can never be permissible. Licensing police to fire into a crowd, even if it means a terrorist is immobilised, would not be generally considered acceptable by the public. This is because geographically, Europe and the US are considered zones of peace so the rules of war and of proportionality do not apply. The actions by the police must, therefore, be legal and in accordance with our civil liberties. Terrorists, being considered criminals by legal standards, must be apprehended, tried in accordance with due process with proper legal representation. They can never be illegally detained or unjustly treated (think Guantanamo Bay).
If police operations are conducted outside of this paradigm, anti-terrorist efforts will risk reflecting the characteristics of terrorism itself. The anti-terrorists must strive to maintain this distinction as Michael Walzer offers,
Additionally, to satisfy the principles of jus ad bellum, a war can only be waged if there is a reasonable prospect of success. The ‘war on terror’, or against ISIS on home soil fails to meet this prerequisite for several reasons. Primarily, the ‘war on terror’ has no visible end and risks licensing the very humanitarian crimes it aims to prevent. Consider the state of emergency in France announced by Hollande. If this ‘state’ had remained limited to a more restricted timeframe, the French authorities and police would not be suffering the public-relations backlash for purported human rights abuses. The widespread anti-Muslim sentiment in response to these attacks also added fuel to terrorist campaigns; if an increasing divide can be created between us-and-them, recruitment is easily met and violence inevitably follows.
Secondly, the dualistic nature of ISIS makes it considerably difficult to combat. ISIS-affiliated branches do not require a central, cohesive element to conduct terror attacks. Even if these groups were discovered and attacks subverted, the extension of the ISIS message (or calls to wage jihad) exist in a realm David Kilcullen refers to as the “Internationale”. This sphere is the broadcasting space of ISIS (mostly via social media) that generally targets naive, disgruntled and disenfranchised youths who can be commissioned and trained from their living rooms. The prolific use of the online world has essentially opened Pandora’s Box. Despite Twitter shutting down 125,000 accounts featuring pro-ISIS messaging, ISIS has already effectively become a brand for aspiring jihadis.
Hassan Hassan explains this is because the ideology expressed by ISIS leaders lives on past their martyrdom; it simply passes to the second tier then to the third when respective leaders are captured or killed. The “most wanted” leaders may have been detained but this does not reduce the status of the brand or, the effectiveness of their ideology. The very structure of the terrorist organisation resembles something akin to the Lernaean Hydra; if one head is removed, two manage to grow back in its place. The prospects of winning a war against an ideologically compelling and decentralised agency are not favourable therefore, this cannot be a just war.
Despite being unable to fulfil this criterion, ISIS still warrants opposition outside the caliphate. Especially if the pushback from affiliated groups increases in response to Trump’s latest Twitter announcement. According to Walzer, this can be achieved justly but we must strongly oppose the collective guilt terrorists exploit. Primarily by not conducting affairs worthy of reprimand or in other words, to avoid acting ‘terroristically’. Additionally, there needs to be the resolute consensus that terrorism, under any guise, is never acceptable. To achieve the former, we must morally consider what is and is not just in police conduct and in policy. For the latter, by never succumbing to the belief that even when an anti-terrorist campaign is carried out unjustly, it does not license terrorist response but only confirms just how wrong terrorism is.
President Donald Trump’s recent tweet boasting the capture of five of the “most wanted” ISIS leaders announces another major feat in the ‘war on terror’.
Five Most Wanted leaders of ISIS just captured!— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) May 10, 2018
But what does this mean for the war against ISIS at home? Data reveals upwards of 1,200 people have been killed by ISIS-directed or inspired terror attacks outside of the caliphate, with figures showing an upward trend for these kinds of attacks in Europe and within the United States. Evidently, the aggressive campaign to reclaim Iraqi and Syrian territory has negatively affected this trend.
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| Image Source |
While the impact these high-profile captures have on the belligerent Islamic State’s caliphate is clearly good – it breaks up their ground network making it increasingly impossible to plan and coordinate campaigns – the further reaching dimensions of ISIS remain untouched. These dimensions, or the ISIS-affiliated and inspired ‘cells’, have historically responded to the reduction of territory and to the capture or, successful targeting against its leaders by performing retributive action elsewhere. For example, former French President François Hollande’s commitment to the war on terror and successive air-strikes in Syria both purportedly inspired the coordinated attacks in Paris in 2015.
 |
| Image Source |
This highlights a very real problem for the US and the Global Coalition; how to justly fight against the pushback of ISIS outside of the caliphate.
Firstly, it should be stated, that the ‘war at home’ is not a real war. The requirements, while being mostly restricted to police work, render rules pertaining to what is ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ in warfare void. Civilian casualties in this instance, unlike in the contexts of war, can never be permissible. Licensing police to fire into a crowd, even if it means a terrorist is immobilised, would not be generally considered acceptable by the public. This is because geographically, Europe and the US are considered zones of peace so the rules of war and of proportionality do not apply. The actions by the police must, therefore, be legal and in accordance with our civil liberties. Terrorists, being considered criminals by legal standards, must be apprehended, tried in accordance with due process with proper legal representation. They can never be illegally detained or unjustly treated (think Guantanamo Bay).
If police operations are conducted outside of this paradigm, anti-terrorist efforts will risk reflecting the characteristics of terrorism itself. The anti-terrorists must strive to maintain this distinction as Michael Walzer offers,
“[Otherwise this] line between police and criminals is blurred by … brutality or corruption.”
(Michael Walzer on the Treatment of Enemy Combatants)
Additionally, to satisfy the principles of jus ad bellum, a war can only be waged if there is a reasonable prospect of success. The ‘war on terror’, or against ISIS on home soil fails to meet this prerequisite for several reasons. Primarily, the ‘war on terror’ has no visible end and risks licensing the very humanitarian crimes it aims to prevent. Consider the state of emergency in France announced by Hollande. If this ‘state’ had remained limited to a more restricted timeframe, the French authorities and police would not be suffering the public-relations backlash for purported human rights abuses. The widespread anti-Muslim sentiment in response to these attacks also added fuel to terrorist campaigns; if an increasing divide can be created between us-and-them, recruitment is easily met and violence inevitably follows.
Secondly, the dualistic nature of ISIS makes it considerably difficult to combat. ISIS-affiliated branches do not require a central, cohesive element to conduct terror attacks. Even if these groups were discovered and attacks subverted, the extension of the ISIS message (or calls to wage jihad) exist in a realm David Kilcullen refers to as the “Internationale”. This sphere is the broadcasting space of ISIS (mostly via social media) that generally targets naive, disgruntled and disenfranchised youths who can be commissioned and trained from their living rooms. The prolific use of the online world has essentially opened Pandora’s Box. Despite Twitter shutting down 125,000 accounts featuring pro-ISIS messaging, ISIS has already effectively become a brand for aspiring jihadis.
 |
| Image Source |
Hassan Hassan explains this is because the ideology expressed by ISIS leaders lives on past their martyrdom; it simply passes to the second tier then to the third when respective leaders are captured or killed. The “most wanted” leaders may have been detained but this does not reduce the status of the brand or, the effectiveness of their ideology. The very structure of the terrorist organisation resembles something akin to the Lernaean Hydra; if one head is removed, two manage to grow back in its place. The prospects of winning a war against an ideologically compelling and decentralised agency are not favourable therefore, this cannot be a just war.
Despite being unable to fulfil this criterion, ISIS still warrants opposition outside the caliphate. Especially if the pushback from affiliated groups increases in response to Trump’s latest Twitter announcement. According to Walzer, this can be achieved justly but we must strongly oppose the collective guilt terrorists exploit. Primarily by not conducting affairs worthy of reprimand or in other words, to avoid acting ‘terroristically’. Additionally, there needs to be the resolute consensus that terrorism, under any guise, is never acceptable. To achieve the former, we must morally consider what is and is not just in police conduct and in policy. For the latter, by never succumbing to the belief that even when an anti-terrorist campaign is carried out unjustly, it does not license terrorist response but only confirms just how wrong terrorism is.
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