Yemen: The Forgotten War
Carmen Noel
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Credit:Global Risk Insight |
The Just War
tradition and its’ long-standing commitment to ‘legitimate authority’ as an
essential part and principle of just wars, has lost its stronghold. As the nature of conflict has shifted
most wars are no longer states fighting states, but states fighting rogue
forces, fundamentalist rogue ‘states’ or internal civil conflicts and wars.
This challenge Just War Theory (JTW) traditionalists and their state-centric
theoretical framework - as the classic modern conflict simply does not apply. Revisionists have sought overturn several
of the principles of the traditionalists, including the issue of legitimate
authority and national defence. In their view the right to go to war is not
only held by sovereign states, but non-state actors as well. Cecile
Fabre argues that moral justification of
resorting to civil war tends to be relatively uncontroversial as long it
is a rebellion against an abusive power; be it a colonial regime, an external
occupier or a very repressive, abusive regime.
How does this revisionist perception apply to the on-going civil war,
and civilian crisis, in Yemen? Does the Houthi rebellion fulfil the
criteria of ‘jus ad bellum’ - the right to go to war?
'The Worlds's Conflicts' map; most on-going conflicts are intra-state.
More than 'just' a Proxy-War
Even though the Yemeni Civil War is often referred to as a proxy-war between the Saudi-Arabian coalition and Iran, I would argue that the conflict has more to it than that. The situation in Yemen dates back to the times before the Yemeni unification in 1990. Yemen has been ‘divided’ into north and south - a division that despite unification of Yemen has held socio-politically. With the uprising of the Arab Spring and the overthrow of leaders in both Egypt and Tunisia, the Yemeni population protested against their autocratic state leader Ali Abdullah Saleh and forced him to give up his power. His prime minister, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, took over after an ‘election’ and later decided to extend his term as state leader. However, Hadi had relatively little support among the people. In this moment of unrest, with a weak state and army, the Houthi rebel movement saw an opportunity and seized control of the capital Sanaa in September 2014.
The (2017) area division is quite similar to the former 'north and south-Yemen'
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Credit: Brookings |
The Houthi Movement
The Houthis is first and foremost a movement of Zaydi Shiites. The movement has a strong belief of rebelling against corrupt leaders and regimes, and emerged as a resistance to Ali Abdullah Saleh's regimes in the 90s. Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East, and the Houthis accused Saleh of stealing the country's wealth. Mona El-Naggar tells the story of a young man growing up as a Houthi in the Northern province of Saudi. A story of conflict, repression and brutality in the fight against the government for the rights of the Zaydi sect.
“(...)being tortured by military captors who dragged his clutched fists over splintered wood, pushing the sharp pieces under his nails. He was a teenager then.”
After the 2003 U.S. Invasion of Iraq the movement got highly radicalized, with a deep hatred toward the government, and against those who supported Arab dictators - the West.
So, does the Houthi rebellion fulfil the criteria of ‘jus ad bellum’?
1) Just Cause - they experienced continuous repression and discrimination. After the repressive Saleh lost his power, Hadi was no better. The revisionist stance would consider this criteria fulfilled.
2) Proper Authority - Revisionist does consider rebellion against oppression a proper authority.
3) Last Resort - When it comes to civil war, last resort is always difficult. For what is last resort in a civil war? Can't they press their claims by legal, nonviolent, means? In the case of the Houthis, a long period of repression and the opportunity they were introduced with, it may be morally weight out as a last resort, or only chance.
4) Probability of Success - With economic support from Iran and the weak state Yemen was in, power and control was arguably probable. However, the Houthi's goal is still unknown.
5) Right Intention - The intention of the Houthi rebels is unclear. Yet, one of their core values is to get rid of corrupt and illegitimate leaders.6) Proportionality - The conflict has been proportionate.
There is something about the Houthi rebellion. It seems like their initial idea, motivation and rebellion fulfil the criteria of 'jus ad bellum'. Though one may criticise how easy it is to interpret and slightly 'bend the rules'. Moreover, without knowing the real intention or goal of the rebellion, criteria 4 and 5 can not be properly assessed.
Finally, if the Houthi rebellion did fulfil the criteria of jus ad bellum - should that be independent from the justice in war - jus in bello? According to Lazar, most revisionists think of them as dependent. The situation in Yemen, like most civil conflicts, is hardest on the civilian people. Is it too much suffering for the initial actions and conflict to be justifiable? The tactical use of civilian suffering, starvation, and deaths have left the Yemeni people on the brink of starvation. Children especially suffer from the endurance of the war. Some of them have not even experienced peaceful times. This BBC News clip shows some of the horrors of the forgotten war in Yemen.
Sadly, the 'forgotten' civil war - a war where all the sides seem to be fighting to be the lesser evil - will be hard to end. A Civil War and a Proxy war, where all sides have committed war crimes.
Want to know a bit more of the Houthis?
'Inside story', Al Jazeera - Is there an end to the war in Yemen? is an interesting and short insight report of the Houthis and the conflict in Yemen.
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